Civilized Borders: A Study of Israel\u27s New Border Regime by Braverman, Irus
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2011 
Civilized Borders: A Study of Israel's New Border Regime 
Irus Braverman 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Irus Braverman, Civilized Borders: A Study of Israel's New Border Regime, 43 Antipode 264 (2011). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/327 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Irus Braverman, Civilized Borders: A Study of Israel's New 
Border Regime, 43 Antipode 264 (2011), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-8330.2010.00773.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms 
and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Civilized Borders 
A Study of Israel’s New Crossing Administration 
Irus Braverman  
University at Buffalo School of Law, The State University of New York 
irusb@buffalo.edu 
Abstract: At Israel’s new border crossings with the West Bank, modernization has become the 
buzz-word: not only referring to modernized mechanical means – a Wall, newly designed 
crossings, and micro-mechanics such as turnstiles, signs, and fences – but also to new and 
sophisticated scientific technologies, such as sensor machines and scanners, and to modernized 
means of identification, such as advanced computer systems and biometric cards. This paper 
considers the transformation of the Israel-West Bank border to be a result of four major 
processes: reterritorialization, bureaucratization, neoliberalization, and de-humanization. I utilize 
in-depth interviews with top military and state officials and with human rights activists as well as 
a series of participatory observations to explore the on-the-ground implications of the borders’ 
transformation.  
 
Keywords: borders, Israel/Palestine, Thing theory, neoliberalism, bureaucratization, 
territorialization, regulation of movement 
 
Introduction 
The occupation of three years ago . . . is not the occupation of today. The 
occupation has undergone a process of professionalization, or I don’t 
know what to call it. Today the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Spokesperson 
will tell you that everything is much more humane and much more 
adapted. No one stands in the rain any more and god knows . . . everything 
is in tip-top shape (Hanna Barag, activist at MachsomWatch, interview,  
August 7, 2008). 
According to Palestinian Israeli Knesset member Azmi Bishara (2006), Israel has 
become “the state of the checkpoints,” the occupied territories are the “land of 
checkpoints,” the Israelis are “the owners of checkpoints,” and the Palestinians are “the 
people of the land of checkpoints”. At least from a Palestinian perspective, then, the 
relationship between the two peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, is very much formed 
within and informed by the space (and time) of the checkpoint. This presentation 
highlights the military nature of Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians in the occupied 
West Bank and its underlying scheme of heightened control.  
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Yet this presentation also corresponds with what Derek Gregory has identified as 
the “twilight zones” of “mobile frontiers”: a cartography of temporariness where 
“nothing is fixed, nothing is clear” and, in effect, whereby every space in the occupied 
Palestinian territories becomes a border. “The border keeps creeping along, surrounding 
villages and watering places” (Gregory 2004: 126-128). Similarly, the recent literature on 
borders has been increasingly stressing the growing informalization and flexibilization of 
border enforcement. In the context of the European Union, a number of scholars have 
highlighted the deterritorialization of border enforcement, namely that it has moved 
inwards to encroach upon everyday spaces and that it has become more mobile, more ad 
hoc, less formalized and, as a result, more omnipotent and dangerous (Bigo and Guild 
2005; Andreas and Snyder 2000).  
A similar development has been identified by various border scholars with regard 
to the US-Mexico border, namely the migration of border enforcement into the interior 
and into multiple aspects of daily life as well as its rescaling by various government 
agencies (Amoore 2006; Coleman 2007; Gilbert 2007; Varsanyi 2008; Winders 2007). 
These changes have been captured in a variety of overlapping terms such as 
globalization, deterritorialization, and the breaking, blurring, merging, and morphing of 
traditional borders along with the appearance of new borders (Marx 2007: 84-85). 
It is precisely this mobile and capricious impression that the State of Israel has 
been trying to move away from, at least toward certain audiences. Instead of what it 
formerly identified as “checkpoints,” the Israeli vocabulary now emphasizes the terms 
“border crossings” and, yet more recently, “international terminals.” But the shift is not 
only in vocabulary. It is a shift in the governing philosophy applied at the Israeli-West 
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Bank border: from a military to a consumer-based approach, from old style checkpoints 
to new and modernized border crossings, administered through a rationalized 
bureaucracy. If before the checkpoint represented an uncertain and transient place, 
operated by the whims of ad hoc, low-level soldiers and policemen, it is now being 
transformed, so Israel’s official claim goes, into a permanent physical construction, 
regulated by and operated through automated devices and professional officers. Israel’s 
old-time occupation, the claim continues, with its narrow focus on security and its 
aggressive on-the-ground manifestations, is now being replaced by efficient regulatory 
systems that foster an open and cooperative relationship with Palestinians.  
The paper thus takes the debate in the current literature on borders toward a 
different direction. Essentially, it reminds readers that border regimes are historical and 
geographical contingencies in terms of logic and operation. In particular, if the EU and 
the US-Mexico borders are becoming leakier and more mobile in terms of their operation, 
the Israel-West Bank case is clearly not following this trend, at least not exclusively so. 
While some aspects of this border are indeed fluid and capricious – or, in Michael 
Mann’s terms, military and “despotic” – it is at the same time becoming more fixed, more 
territorial, more bureaucratic, and more “infrastructural” – again, using Michael Mann’s 
terminology (Mann 1984).  
This reterritorialization of the border is not, by any means, intended to create a de 
facto two-state solution, nor is it an Israeli disengagement in action. It is, rather, a shift in 
the mode of occupation in the West Bank: from an ad hoc military power to a 
sophisticated, modernized, and professional bureaucratic regime.  Which brings me to my 
second point: that the reterritorialization of Israel’s border regime in the West Bank is 
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strongly tied to bureaucratic power. In this sense, my analysis departs from the narrow 
military lens of much of the critical literature in geography on this topic (see, e.g., 
Gregory 2004; Graham 2002a; 2002b). It explores the changes in the Israeli/West Bank 
border administration since the Oslo Agreement of 1993 and, in yet more detail, in the 
aftermath of the second Intifada of 2004. This emphasis is a direct response to Joe 
Heyman’s call for a reflective and critical literature on bureaucracies in unequal societies 
(1995: 285). My use of the term bureaucracy draws on Max Weber’s typology of rational 
administration (in Gerth and Mills 1946: 204), which is part of his larger discussion of 
societal power, as well as on Michael Herzfeld’s emphasis on bureaucracy’s indifference 
toward outsiders (1992: 19).   
Thirdly, I situate this movement toward bureaucratization and the overall 
civilizing mission of the Israeli occupation regime in a neoliberal context. Here, my work 
draws on and corresponds with a growing trend in the literature on borders. This 
literature emphasizes neoliberalism as shaped at once by the transnational entrenchment 
of free market rights – which refashions state practices in the idealized images of the free 
market – and the increasingly oppressive impact of securitized nationalism (Sparke 2006: 
174; Varsanyi 2008).  
Indeed, at Israel’s new border crossings, modernization has become a buzz-word: 
not only referring to modernized mechanical means – a Separation Barrier, newly 
designed crossings, and micro-mechanics such as turnstiles, signs, and fences – but also 
to new and sophisticated scientific technologies, such as sensor machines and scanners, 
and to modernized means of identification, such as advanced computer systems and 
biometric cards. Finally, there is also the modernized human management of the border: 
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Israel has recently been transitioning from employing military personnel to the recent 
deployment of security guards hired by private companies. This, government officials 
stress, is part of a progressive effort to professionalize border operations and make them 
more efficient. It also makes the border into a more humane place. The term used by 
Israeli officials to indicate this shift in the human management of the border is 
“civilization” (izruach). 
Underlying Israel’s shift from the old-style checkpoint to the new crossing has 
been a concern about its public image. Both the Israeli and the international media 
increasingly critiqued what was portrayed as a regime of daily harassment of Palestinians 
by Israeli soldiers.i These images have elicited criticism in Israel and worldwide. In its 
performance of non-traditional military roles, then, the reputation of Israel’s Defense 
Forces (IDF) as a strong and moral army was slowly eroding. This called for a dramatic 
change. 
Fourthly, the paper explores the changes in Israel’s border administration from the 
perspective of things. Throughout, it stresses the physicality of the technologies used at 
the border crossings, mostly drawing on the literature of Science and Technology Studies 
that focuses on things (see, e,g,. Brown 2001) as actants that operate within human-
nonhuman networks (see, e.g., Callon 1986; Latour 1987). The Separation Barrier and the 
architectural design of the crossings are two of the larger examples of physical border 
technologies that I provide here, which are followed by a number of smaller things 
designed into the border: signs, mechanized queues, turnstiles, and chimneys, as well as 
sensor machines, plastic cards, paper permits, and computers.  
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What most interests me here is the work that the materiality of things does to 
naturalize, normalize, and fix the mobile power dynamics that take place at the border, a 
work that is done precisely through their enactment in space. At the same time, I show 
that the physical cannot sustain itself as an exclusive technology of control. Rather, the 
threat of violence is always implicit in the physical state of things at the border crossing 
(Handel 2007). Through the design of nonhuman things into the infrastructure of the 
border, it is made to seem not only inevitable, scientific, and neutral, but also progressive 
and civilized. But eventually, the intensified use of things – in effect, the de-
humanization of the Israel-West Bank border – also translates into a project of 
dehumanizing the Palestinian at the border. 
Finally, the paper is unique in the methodology it employs in this context. It relies 
on a dozen in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in the summer and fall of 2008 
with former and present high military officials and with several activists in the Jewish 
Israeli human rights and women’s organization MachsomWatch. It also relies on my own 
observations as a former member of MachsomWatch, which I conducted on a weekly 
basis between 2002 and 2004, along with participatory observations that I conducted in 
the summers of 2005, 2006, and 2008 at Qalandia/Atarot (Arabic/Hebrew), 
Bethlehem/Rachel, and Abu-Dis/Zeitim. Together, the interviews and observations 
construct an “insider ethnography” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:31) that reveals some of 
the on-the-ground implications of the spatial and administrative modernization of the 
crossings.  
As far as I know, the recording of Israel’s acclaimed process of modernization 
from the personalized perspectives of both high military officials and human rights 
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activists has not been utilized in other studies on the Israel-West Bank border (see, e.g., 
Weizman 2007; Handel 2007; Abu-Zahra 2007; and Neve Gordon 2008; see Heyman 
1995 for a similar ethnographic approach, albeit in the context of the US-Mexico border). 
The paper starts by identifying the territorial aspects of the new border – namely, 
its mechanical fixing into the infrastructural design of the place, moves to explore its 
bureaucratic dimensions – namely, its heightened focus on identification and 
computerization, and concludes by reflecting on some of the neoliberal stances that 
underlie the project of transforming the border’s management to civilian hands. 
Fixing the Border: A Project of Reterritorialization 
In the beginning the checkpoint was made up of large tin barrels filled 
with stones… the barrels were later filled with concrete. They were soon 
replaced by red and white plastic road barriers, which were later 
themselves replaced with concrete road barriers, to which large concrete 
cubes were added, to which fencings of barbed wire were added and then 
rocks of many sizes (Bishara, in Weizman 2007: 148). 
The Separation Barrier 
 
 
Figure 1: Israel’s Multilayered Security Fence System, 2008. Courtesy of Israel’s Ministry of Defense 
In June 2002, the government of Israel decided to erect a physical barrier to 
separate Israel from the West Bank. In most areas along its 723 kilometer-long route, the 
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barrier is comprised of an electronic fence with dirt paths, barbed-wire fences, and 
trenches on both sides, at an average width of 60 meters (Figure 1). In some areas, a wall 
eight meters high has been erected in place of the barrier system. The Separation Barrier 
was to replace the previous situation whereby hundreds of checkpoints, mostly transient 
(or in the Israeli military jargon: “flying”; Handel 2007), were scattered through 
numerous routes, not only those leading into Israel but also those within the occupied 
territories themselves (Tirza, interview). The new border regime’s focus has been 
situated, conversely, on the line drawn between Israel and the occupied West Bank, and 
here is where its main efforts lie. In effect, the total number of checkpoints and 
roadblocks has been reduced in the new regime, a fact that the military officials 
interviewed here have highlighted to demonstrate Israel’s improved humanitarian attitude 
toward Palestinians (Paz and Tirza, interviews).  
 
Figure 2: The Wall at Gush Etzion (Etzion bloc). Photo by author, August 2008 
Barriers and walls perform a straight-forward physical task: they prevent 
movement between the two sides they construct, thereby funneling human (and certain 
 8 
nonhuman) traffic to specific sites, be they crossings, gates, passages, terminals, or 
checkpoints. These sites then become obligatory passage points (Graham 2007). Similar 
to the US-Mexico border, which, at least on the face of things, blocks passage from south 
to north only (see, e.g., Fletcher and Weisman 2006), Israel’s Separation Barrier is also 
apparently constructed to block only movement in one direction: from Israel into the 
occupied territories, and only by those who are perceived as threatening Israel’s national 
enterprise. The movement of Jewish Israelis, especially settlers, is to remain easy and 
swift. This brings to mind the operation of expedited lanes in the US borders with Mexico 
and Canada, which operate based on the distinction between safe travelers, deemed for a 
high-fit primary processing, and questionable travelers, made subject to the ordeals of 
secondary processing (Sparke 2006: 160; Pallitto and Heyman 2008: 319).  
But the distinctions between quick lanes at the US border and the binary mobility 
regime enacted by Israel far outweigh the similarities: First, while at the US border the 
separate lanes are part of the same crossing, in this instance settlers and Palestinians are 
funneled into separate crossings altogether (Weizman 2007: 147), demonstrating Israel’s 
deterministic view of risk, namely one that sees in every Palestinian a terrorist (Gregory 
2004: 21). This makes communication (or friction) between the two populations very 
difficult.  
Secondly, while the US-Mexico quick-lane passage is essentially an economic 
privilege bought by business class travelers, here one’s national identity predetermines 
the bifurcated alternatives. Colonel (retired) Tirza –Head of Security Fence Operations 
1994-2007 – provides an example for this bifurcated separation: Eliyahu Crossing, at the 
center of Israel, “is built for passage of Israelis,” he says, while “nearby there’s an 
 9 
agricultural gate for Palestinian farmers.” Tirza compares this project with “the American 
system called ‘profiling,’” (Tirza, interview) and explains that in order to manage risk 
effectively, Israel must distinguish between safe and dangerous populations, which 
translates here into a separation of Israelis from Palestinians. Tirza’s depiction 
corresponds with various scholarly studies on the proliferation of risk management 
techniques as a means of governing mobilities (Amoore 2006: 337; and, more generally, 
Beck 1992).  
A third difference between the two border geographies has to do with the means 
of movement that their administration affords to the crosser. Since the Oslo Accords of 
1993, Palestinian cars have been prohibited from entering Israel. According to Tirza, 
“Palestinian cars don’t enter because we don’t have sufficient means to examine cars” 
(Tirza, interview). As a result, Palestinians must cross the border by foot. Crossing the 
border on foot is humiliating. It also strips Palestinians from the privileges of modern 
mobility, indirectly supporting the construction of every Palestinian as illegal, because 
who else would cross international borders by foot? As far as I know, this sort of blanket 
restriction toward an entire population has not been practiced on any of the US borders 
and on any other border for that matter. 
Lastly, since Israeli settlers reside in scattered locations throughout the occupied 
West Bank and not in any particular side of the barrier, Israel’s task of securing them as 
well as its own territories is somewhat more complicated than that on the US-Mexico 
border. Either way, the enhanced mobility afforded to the Israeli settlers is a direct 
consequence of the respective enclosure of the Palestinians, and vice versa (on the 
distinction between enclosure and mobility see Cunningham and Heyman 2004).  
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Several years prior to the Wall’s construction in Jerusalem, low concrete 
blockades and roadblocks were prominent in certain areas. This ad hoc border was 
“passable,” in the sense that Palestinians soon found routes around, under, and over it 
(Figure 3, left). However, when visiting the village of Abu-Dis in north-east Jerusalem in 
the summer of 2008, I encountered a different scene altogether. The semi-structured 
border has turned into a 24-foot-high Wall (Figure 3, right), and thus the numerous 
improvised crossings have vanished from the border’s landscape and replaced with large 
crossings situated at much further distances from one another. In effect, the people of 
Abu-Dis, some of whom are residents of Jerusalem, must now travel for miles—and 
through a border crossing – to reach what was once the other side of the street.  
  
Figure 3: The same street in Abu-Dis before (on left) and after (on right) the Wall. Photo on left by 
Neta Efroni, February 15, 2002; photo on right by Rachel Naparstek, May 4, 2005.  
Both courtesy of MachsomWatch 
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Border Crossings  
I see the passages as regular international passages. We try to make it so 
that the passage will be quick and swift, without any unnecessary 
interactions. 
                                                              Interview, Micha, Head of Administration  
                                                                              and Funding, Crossing Administration 
 Checkpoints, crossings, terminals, roadblocks, inspection points – Israel’s 
military vocabulary is rich and specific, linguistically setting the stage for and reflecting 
various physical means of managing movement (see also Cunningham and Heyman 
2004; Pallitto and Heyman 2008; Amoore 2006; Adey 2004; Sparke 2006). Together, 
these forms of movement govern the entire spectrum of Palestinian life under Israeli 
occupation (see also Weizman 2007: 147).  
In the old border regime, the checkpoints were situated in open space, where they 
were means of blocking movement. Then, Palestinians frequently worked around the 
checkpoints, many of them crossing illegally to get to work on the Israeli side. In the new 
regime, however, working around the wall or barrier is physically much more taxing (one 
can either dig below it or fly above it, the latter being almost impossible). In effect, the 
crossings have become potential (yet obligatory) points of passage. The barrier’s slow 
but steady construction has thus gradually transformed the nature of the checkpoints, 
making the structure and management of the official crossings all the more important. In 




Figure 4: Old-style checkpoint in El Hader, south of Jerusalem. Photo by author, July 2004 
The Separation Barrier contains 140 crossings composed of 40 or so pedestrian 
and commercial crossings and 100 agricultural gates (Tirza, interview). Not all crossings 
are staffed, Paz says, “because some are staffed only when they need opening.” He 
suggests that there are another 30 or so checkpoints within the West Bank (not along the 
border) and approximately 500 roadblocks (Paz, interview).  
Generally, every space embodies two alternative states of movement: “Go” or 
“No Go” (Levy 1997), or enclosure and mobility (Cunningham and Heyman 2004). The 
border presents a third state: the liminal movement that lies in between the “go-no-go” 
stages (Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1975). For the most part, this is a temporary stage, a 
place in passing. Yet under the new Israeli border regime this liminal stage has been 
stretched in both space and time. The Qalandia crossing, situated north of Jerusalem by 
way of Ramallah, provides an excellent example of this stretch: the two to three stage 
process used in most border crossings around the world extends here to five stages that 
are dispersed and separated through a maze of fences and enclosed spaces (Figure 5). 
Accordingly, 
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The new system includes a labyrinth of iron fences that channels 
passengers via a series of turnstiles. All passengers must go through five 
stages: the first set of turnstiles, the x-ray gates, the second set of 
turnstiles, the inspection booth and an x-ray machine for the bags. This 
entire process is captured by a dense network of cameras, and the 
passenger is given instructions via loudspeakers. From their protected 
booths, Israeli security personnel operate the revolving gates remotely, 
regulating the rate of passenger flow. The inspection booths are encased in 
bulletproof glass (Weizman 2007: 150). 
 
Figure 5: A 2005 scheme of Qalandia crossing (Israel on left, West Bank on right). Courtesy of the 
Applied Research Institute Jerusalem  
Moreover, for the Palestinian, the process of crossing the border starts long before 
actually reaching the border itself: first, with the “upstream” preparations for the journey 
– both in the sense of getting the right papers and the right life (even avoiding the wrong 
kind of prior victimization, as illustrated below) – then with the actual journey to the 
border through limited roads and checkpoints scattered on the wayii and, finally, with the 
“downstream” carrying of the border after crossing it. The prolonged state of liminality 
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eventually extends to such a degree that the Palestinian comes to embody it and to take it 
with him or her wherever and whenever they go. 
Yet although the Palestinian’s embodiment of a liminal spatiality and temporality 
extends beyond the actual space and time of the border crossing and in this sense it is 
internalized and thus portable (Amoore 2006: 338; Ophir 2004) – it is precisely the new 
border administration’s intense focus on territorial infrastructure and its corresponding 
fixed bureaucracies that have enabled this extension. While both border productions exist 
in this context, this paper’s focus is on the spatially and temporally confined process of 
movement through the actual border crossing. 
The regime of separation created by the post-Oslo border regime is double-edged: 
while its focus is the prohibition of Palestinians from entering into Israel, its less attended 
to proliferations are the prohibitions of Israeli citizens from crossing into the urban areas 
of the occupied territories (namely, Area A) (see, e.g., Figure 6). This apparent symmetry 
encompasses many underlying asymmetries: First, while inspected on their way back to 
Israel, Israelis (although, to a much lesser extent, Palestinian Israelis) that have crossed 
the border illegally are only potentially susceptible to future criminal charges. By 
contrast, Palestinians who illegally crosses into Israel undergo an immediate 
administrative detention that assigns them a permanent “prohibited” status (see below). 
The entry prohibition toward Israelis does not apply to Areas B and C of the occupied 
Palestinian territories, which are defined as such precisely because Israeli settlers live 
there, and therefore are accessible to Israelis by definition. In effect, Jewish Israeli 
settlers weave across the lines wherever and whenever they please. 
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Figure 6: A sign on the way to Jaba (Lil) checkpoint reads: “This way leads to Area A… Israeli 
entrance to Area A is prohibited, risks your life, and constitutes a criminal offence!” Photo by Tamar 
Fleishman, May 2009. Courtesy of MachsomWatch 
But for the large majority of Jewish Israelis, the distinctions between A, B, and C 
as well as the distinctions between the various crossings are irrelevant: the border is a 
dead-end, not a point of passage. Israelis rarely venture beyond the border to visit the 
Palestinian territories. This, it seems, is an important implication of separation regimes at 
large: when separating one group from the other, both groups are singled out. In other 
words, boundaries are fundamental to defining what is on both sides (Cunningham and 
Heyman 2004: 295). In effect, many Israelis only look at the border from the outside; 
they do not access the space or communicate with the people that lie and live beyond it.  
The invisibility of Palestinian territories and people in the eyes of Jewish Israelis 
is also strongly tied to the theme of secrecy. Hanna Barag of MachsomWatch tells me 
that Israelis are not only prohibited from entering into certain Palestinian territories, but 
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also from entering into the new terminals (to monitor soldier behavior, for example; see 
Braverman 2008). In her words,  
There’s this craziness in Israel that everything must be a secret, [even] 
things that are open for everyone to see. Why can’t I go into the 
Bethlehem checkpoint? What happened? Any foreigner who comes from 
abroad enters and leaves from this checkpoint. At least 3,000 Palestinians 
cross it every morning. What could be so secret there? (interview) 
This corresponds with what Jon Weiner defined as a “deep-seated tendency in all 
bureaucracies toward secrecy.” Classified files, confidential documents, and official 
secrets, he continues, “are the means by which bureaucracies everywhere prevent 
scrutiny and criticism.” In the context of the Israel-West Bank border bureaucracy, 
Israel’s deployment of secrecy reinforces the invisibility of the Palestinian space to the 
larger Israeli public.  
Within the crossings, multiple physical structures and things are physically 
designed to regulate the movement of those who wish to cross from one side to the other, 
especially from the Palestinian side into Israel. The next two subsections focus on some 
of these technological artifacts. 
Micro-Mechanics: Signs, Queues, Turnstiles, and Chimneys  
When approaching Israel’s new border crossings, large signs greet incoming 
passengers with promising images of flowers and trees. At the Qalandia crossing, for 
example, a large image of an open road features a series of signs that read “education,” 
“investment,” and “happy holidays” (Figure 7, right). This image is physically 
surrounded by trash. The disparity between the welcoming image and the trashy reality 
around it makes one wonder about its purpose and effectiveness.  
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Similarly, inside the crossing, signs that wish passengers a “pleasant stay” are 
hidden by several layers of metal fences. In effect, despite their physical existence side by 
side at the space of the border and the balanced approach they are intended to promote, 
the consumer-based approach of the international terminal, on the one hand, and the 
security based approach of the checkpoint, on the other hand, send out rather conflicting 
messages (see also Sparke 2006: 174).  
At the old-style checkpoints, the situation was transient and ad hoc: one moment 
one soldier’s word was the official order of the place, only to be replaced by its opposite 
the next moment. There was no written set of instructions, at least not one that was 
visible to Palestinians. Signs were a rare occurrence. Conversely, at the new border 
crossings a multitude of signs awaits Palestinians at every corner and curve, visibly 
instructing them how to conduct themselves at every step of the way. The abundance of 
signs at the new border are yet another manifestation of Israel’s show of permanence.  
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Figure 7: Entrance to Qalandia Crossing. On left: debris under sign, on right: sign above 
debris. Translation of sign: from background to foreground: Istithmar: investment; Tarbiya wa talim: 
education and teaching; Tanmiya: development; Izdihar: prosperity; Rizk -- "divine gift", blessing, 
livelihood; Kull am wa anutm bi kheir: Eid Greetings. Photo by author, August 2008 
Now that written transcripts have come to exist, they are also vandalized as such, 
most likely by Palestinians. “Welco_ _  t_ th_  insp_ _ _ _ _ poi_ _” reads one of the 
signs, missing most of its Hebrew and English characters, probably a combination of 
Palestinian vandalism and Israeli neglect, not unlike the trash piling up at the entrance. 
The erased sign makes the site of instruction into a hollow caricature of itself, thus 
implicitly turning Israel’s visible regulatory efforts on their head. In effect, the signs, 
along with their erased letters, are both a proclamation of Israel’s new management of the 
crossings according to standardized norms, and a combination of two other statements: 
first, that inscribed by the Palestinians through their erasure of the letters of this text and, 
second, that of Israel’s underlying statement of neglect by not taking action to amend the 
vandalized situation.  
                   
Figure 8: Signs on the Palestinian side of Qalandia crossing. Photos by author, August 2008  
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After encountering the series of welcoming signs, the first stage in the actual 
movement through the crossing is the queue. Whereas officially, the queue is not part of 
the crossing itself but a preliminary function thereof, it is a critical stage in the 
Palestinian’s experience of the border. Many Palestinians secure their position in line 
hours before the border crossing is officially open, hoping to make it to the other side on 
time to meet their employer just before the break of dawn. For years, the queues and their 
management were left to Palestinian responsibility and formed themselves in open space. 
Now, queues are constructed and enforced through metal fences that funnel Palestinian 
movement. 
    
 
Figure 9: Queues and turnstiles in Qalandia. Photos by author, August 2008 
During a visit to Bethlehem crossing, Hanna Barag of MachsomWatch points to a 
special queue designed for disabled people. Yet it is almost always closed, she laments 
(interview). Otherwise, Israel’s physically imposed queues are not designed to 
accommodate groups with special needs, for example parents with children and women. 
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In effect, the new crossings exclude many Palestinians, especially traditional Muslim 
women, who usually refrain from direct physical contact with male strangers.  
Moreover, instead of the old way of managing the Palestinian queue – which 
usually deployed an Israeli soldier shouting “wahad-wahad,” “one-by-one” – the turnstile 
now makes it physically impossible to move in any way other than one-at-a-time and in 
any other direction but forward (Figure 9, right). This mechanism is hardly new, nor is it 
by any means sophisticated. Indeed, Barag refers to the metal queues as “cattle paths” 
and explains that they enable a strict control of movement by Israeli soldiers without 
necessitating any direct physical contact. 
According to scholar Tal Arbel, upon a request by the contractors of Israel’s 
Ministry of Defense, the manufacturer of the turnstiles reduced the length of their metal 
arms from the Israeli and international standard of 75-90 centimeters to 55 centimeters 
when manufacturing for the West Bank and Gaza (Tal Arbel in Weizman 2007). When I 
ask about this unique feature, Colonel Tirza insists that the turnstiles follow international 
standards and are not narrower than those used at, say, a bank. “It’s just mean all these 
things [that people say],” he says in response to Arbel’s claim (interview). Either way, 
Barag testifies as to how the turnstiles regularly trap inside their arms larger people, 
parents with children, people with luggage, and pregnant women (interview; see also 
Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Turnstile in Huwwara, January 2009. Courtesy of MachsomWatch 
Additionally, Barag points out that on top of the turnstiles there are two lights, 
green (go) and red (no go). Simultaneously, she instructs me, the turnstile’s operation is 
controlled by an Israeli guard, who is invisible to the Palestinian passenger. Once the 
passenger is inside the turnstile he is locked in until the invisible operator lets him out. 
The physical design that supposedly enables Palestinian discretion, however limited, is 
thus unnecessary and even misleading. The turnstile actually leaves no such discretion to 
its Palestinian user but rather is entirely controlled by the panoptic gaze of the Israeli 
soldier (but see Braverman 2008). 
Barag also points to the metal fences situated on the top of turnstiles to ensure that 
Palestinians cannot cut the queue from above (Figure 9, middle). Just the other day, she 
continues, a Palestinian was crushed from the pressure between the entrance to the queue, 
on the one hand, and the turnstile, on the other hand, and as a result broke one of his ribs 
(interview). The physical technology of the turnstile, presented by Israel as decreasing 
human friction and promoting orderliness, thus ends up increasing other forms of friction 
and enhancing chaos. It does so, however, with no direct involvement by border officials.  
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Indeed, the nonhuman fixtures used in the new crossings – signs, fences, bars, 
turnstiles – distance their human inflictors and render their effects an inevitable outcome 
of technical design (see also, albeit in a different context, Braverman 2010). This new 
form of inspection is sunk into the infrastructure of the border, and so it becomes 
embedded, standardized, routinized, and thus transparent (see also Graham 2008). As 
infrastructure, these technologies both fix and normalize the securitized modes of border 
operation. 
And from the role of nonhuman technologies in reducing friction to their role in 
reducing time: Colonel Tirza insists that the new crossings facilitate swift and easy 
passage. In his words, “the intention isn’t to block passage but to let people pass and to 
provide a level of service to the person who needs to cross.” “For example,” he says, “I 
told the Court that in the checkpoints [that] I’m building in Jerusalem, anyone who 
doesn’t fall into the profiling won’t wait for more than an hour and a half, even at the 
busiest times. Today we’re at around 20 minutes – at busy times.” (Tirza, interview). By 
contrast, a short video produced by MachsomWatch recorded the Bethlehem crossing at 
4:30am. It shows that only 4 of 12 gates were operative at the time, which resulted in a 
several hour-long queue outside the crossing (Machsomwatch 2008). As in many other 
instances, it is hard to believe that the military officials and the human rights activists are 
actually speaking about the same places. 
The next stage after crossing the first turnstile is the metal detector. Colonel Arieli 
– former head of the Negotiating Administration in then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s 
office and currently a member of the board of the Council for Peace and Security – says 
that “the metal detector for pedestrians [is] right at the beginning, so that no one would 
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smuggle weapons in” (interview). At Bethlehem and Qalandia, the crossers are diverted 
into side rooms for further inspection or funneled to larger waiting rooms. Colonel Tirza 
explains what happens when a Palestinian is identified as posing a high security risk and 
picked out as such from the linear routine. 
If the person is suspected, then he’s put into an additional room where he 
can be examined with additional technologies, for example the sensor. If 
he’s still suspected, he’s entered into the explosives room, and asked to 
take his clothes off.…The room is built … like a regular room but there’s 
a shockwave [that] can disperse with minimal harm. [Anyway, the 
suspect]  goes into the explosives room, gets naked. If there’s no problem 
he’s allowed to continue, if there’s a problem… the professionals are 
brought in.  
The explosion room, Tirza further explains, is designed to facilitate explosion upward 
rather than sideways, which explains the design of chimneys on top of the terminal. He 
says:  
In Qalandia, we built a 70-million shekel (15 million dollar) crossing -- a 
nice, sophisticated crossing. [T]he day after it was opened, an Israeli group 
wrote Arbeit Macht Frei – “work shall set you free”… [They wrote it right 
there], on the sign that says “Welcome to Israel.” There were chimneys, so 
that’s why they did this. [As a result,] the building had to be covered... 
[Now,] the roof hides this chimney – you can’t see it (interview). 
MachsomWatch activist Yehudit Elkana has a different perspective about the 
architectural decision to construct chimneys on top of the new crossings. She ties it to 
Israel’s unfortunate lapse of memory regarding the Holocaust’s important lessons 
(interview). Elkana, herself a daughter of Holocaust survivors, bitterly complains that the 
signs of this tragedy are clearly marked on the ceilings of these fancy new terminals, even 
though they are now hidden from view.   
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Sensor Technologies 
There’s no genius inventions or anything [of the sort]. It’s all simple 
things . . . It’s how you operate the whole system and your intention 
behind it [that make all the difference] (Barag, interview). 
The most profound technologies are those that disappear… They work 
themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable 
from it (Weiser 1991: 94). 
Beyond the infrastructural construction of the crossing, designed to tightly 
manage the physical movement of Palestinian crossers, more mobile fixtures have also 
been placed at the border crossing. Largely, these are put in place to ensure that the 
Palestinian passenger is unarmed. “Look,” says Colonel Tirza in his interview, “there 
were attempts, more than once, to smuggle explosives in the rectum, and all kinds of 
other places, including by women. It’s unavoidable.  … [But] today you have electronic 
means which allow us to [prevent this].”  
In 2006, Israel spent some 50 million dollars on purchasing a series of sensors, 
developed by a United States based company (Figure 11) (Barda 2006). Electronically 
stripping the passenger down to his or her naked body, these sensors replace intimate 
physical contact with the ostensibly less intrusive act of seeing. Beyond being a source of 
information, the project of seeing into the body of the passenger establishes a physical 
and mental distance between the observed and the observer, all in the name of safety and 
security. This nexus between vision and safety is reflected in the product’s name: 
SafeView. According to its manufacturer,  
SafeView's patented technology detects objects composed of metal, 
ceramic, plastic, wood, or other materials that may be concealed. The 
technology was originally developed by a US Department of Energy lab, 
managed by Battelle Memorial Institute . . . SafeView’s patented “active 
millimeter wave technology” is the safe, fast, and effective alternative to 
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metal detectors, x-ray machines, and pat down searches at security 
checkpoints. 
According to Tirza, “Instead of touching, [which is] humiliating… their purpose 
is to check the person and his luggage, without having to touch the person himself” 
(interview). Tirza believes, then, that by eliminating the need for intimate physical 
contact between Israeli border officials and Palestinian passengers (namely, frisks and 
vaginal or rectal searches), this new sensor’s focus on seeing makes the required security 
checks conducted at the border more civilized, more humane (see also Braverman 2009). 
Colonel Arieli explains that: 
The preference for automation in this case stems mainly from the risk to 
the lives of soldiers and the examiners and not just for the sake of 
efficiency itself. Because you know, there’s places where the speediest 
examination is always by a person, [while] the technological process takes 
more time. That’s why here they prioritized [security] (interview).  
 
Figure 11:  SafeView’s Safescout 360 model (http://blogs.zdnet.com/emergingtech/?p=87, last accessed 
January 29, 2009; reprinted with permission) 
 
However, this electronic inspection is no less problematic than the old techniques 
(but see Volokh 2002). First, while pat-down searches involve a limited and known 
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number of border officials, the information recorded by the machine is made potentially 
available not only to the officer at the here-and-now of the border crossing but also to an 
unlimited number of spectators in unknown spaces and temporalities. Also, it is precisely 
the invasiveness of the physical search that has triggered the intense array of legal 
requirements that pertain to searches in a variety of modern jurisdictions around the 
world. But from a legal standpoint, the passenger does not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy at the border. Thus, it is not even clear if he or she are entitled to be made 
aware of the search. “Why do we need his consent?” Bezalel Treiber – current Head of 
the new Crossing Administration – asks me, “everything that has to do with obtaining 
permission wastes precious time,” he concludes (telephone conversation). Finally, the 
focus on seeing the body of the passenger in this risk-phobic way reduces him or her to 
matter: flesh, organs, fluids, and explosives. The passenger’s humanness, in other words, 
is fragmented and objectified.  
Identifying at the Border: The Project of Bureaucratization 
Who was born and who died and who wants to change address and who 
wants to get a passport and who wants to go here or there… All of this  
you have to register… in the Civil Administration. One mustn’t forget that 
the entire registration of citizens, including in Gaza, is controlled by Israel. 
The one who registers the citizens is the one in control… Bureaucracy 
reigns supreme (Barag, interview). 
IDs, Permits, and Blacklists 
The border is territorialized not only by physical designs of mobility and 
enclosure (Cunningham and Heyman 2004) but also by using population registries, 
identity cards, and permit systems to zone population movement (Abu-Zahra 2007; 
Gordon 2008). When passing through the new crossings, Palestinians must carry with 
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them the following set of documents: their personal identification card, a permit to enter 
Israel at the relevant time and place, and a biometric or “smart” card, if they possess one.  
In March 1968, Israel began issuing identity cards to every male over the age of 
sixteen. The cards have to be carried at all times (Gordon 2008: 35). Israeli-issued 
identifications are color-coded, which serves to visibly signify the geographic zone to 
which each person is confined. Initially, Palestinians in the West Bank were obliged to 
carry their identifications in orange plastic, Palestinians in Gaza in red, and Palestinian 
residents of Jerusalem in blue. In 1989, Military Order 1269 introduced green plastic 
covers for the identifications of former detainees, including those who were detained and 
released without charge. License plates follow the same pattern as identification cards 
(Parry 1995 in Abu-Zahra 2007). This seemingly technical administration of color 
hierarchies enables a simple and a routinized form of surveillance.  
In addition to the identification card, a detailed system of permits administered by 
Israel regulates every aspect of Palestinian life. The permit system was first introduced in 
the West Bank following the Oslo Agreement of 1993 (Arieli, interview). Three types of 
permits enable Palestinian entry into Israel: general labor permits, merchant permits, and 
“all kinds of specific permits, whether [for] humanitarian, medical, or family visits.” 
According to MachsomWatch activist Ada Gorni:  
In order to receive a permit to enter they need to go through several stages. 
First they need to submit a request. This costs them 40 shekels [10 dollars] 
in stamps. With this paper they come to the DCO [District Coordination 
Office] and go to the soldier. He checks on the computer. If they are lucky 
they get a magnetic card on the spot . . . The magnetic card is the first 
stage. Now you have to submit a request to enter (interview). 
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To obtain any permit, the person requesting it cannot be “prohibited” by either the 
Israeli police or the Israeli Security Agency (Shabak). Brigadier General (ret.) Ilan Paz – 
former Head of the Civil Administration in the West Bank – explains that:  
[Prohibited by] the police is someone who got a fine and didn’t pay it or 
has a criminal record. It’s not a large number. The Shabak’s listing [on the 
other hand,] is very serious: tens of thousands going on 200,000 people are 
blacklisted. [This,] because there’s a procedure for blacklisting a person 
but there’s no procedure for removing a name from the blacklist. Anyone 
who’s blacklisted -- it’s almost for good (interview).  
Paz continues: 
Anyone who was involved in actions against security, anyone suspected of 
being involved in actions against security, anyone serving in the 
Palestinian security forces . . . Anyone who’s been married for several 
years and has no children… And there’s things that are less pleasant – like 
[blacklisting . . .] in order to [convince people] to collaborate, etc… 
Around 2 out of 3 adult Palestinian men are blacklisted. 
 
A computerized data system manages Israel’s blacklisting of Palestinians. This 
system, Paz says, “includes whether a person is blacklisted, at what level, . . . and all 
kinds of information we know about him.” A connection to this system is now available 
at every crossing and in all the District Coordination Offices.    
Hanna Barag of MachsomWatch depicts the computer as the utmost symbol of 
Israel’s convoluted bureaucracy of occupation: 
You can’t maintain occupation with guns. It doesn’t work. It didn’t work. 
It won’t work. So they look for another tool. And this other tool is 
bureaucracy: … taking over with the help of computers. What’s easier? 
What’s simpler? (interview). 
Gathering, centralizing, and constantly updating information about Palestinians, 
the computer creates a world of knowledge that is largely inaccessible to them, again 
contributing to the reinforcement of secrecy and invisibility at the border. Yet while the 
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computer apparently functions quite well when utilized by Israel, it is much less reliable 
when it comes to Palestinian usage. Here, from the perspective of Ada Gorni, another 
Machsom Watch activist: 
I was thinking that perhaps we can raise some money for the IDF to get 
them some more computers. There are only two in the DCO and also only 
two machines that produce the magnetic cards. And these machines break 
down constantly. There is always a problem: the computer breaks down, 
the machine doesn’t work. “Computer harbana” they say to the 
Palestinians or sometimes they don’t say anything at all and the 
Palestinians just sit outside and wait the entire day. This is 21st century 
technology. And no one bothers to update the people sitting outside and 
waiting, no one tells them “today the computer is out of order” (interview). 
When applied toward Palestinians, then, the computer’s physical thingness is highlighted, 
namely as something that can and that often does break. And things tend to become 
visible when they fail (Star and Strauss 1999). At the same time, when utilized by Israel 
this same computer system is made to seem technologically savvy. Highly dependent on 
the computer’s operation, the smart card has recently become the pride of Israel’s new 
border administration.  
Smart Cards 
First, there was the magnetic card. This card was required in addition to the 
permit, needed to be renewed every year or two and was, essentially, “an authorization 
that you’re not blacklisted” (interview, Paz). In 2004, Israel began replacing the magnetic 
with biometric cards, first in Gaza and later in the West Bank. A senior official in the 
new Passage Administration explains that: “The reason we don’t use magnetic cards any 
more is that they are easy to forge. The biometric card, [on the other hand,] is absolute. 
The idea is to supply such cards only to those Palestinians that want to pass into Israel. 
Otherwise it would be very expensive” (Micha, interview). 
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Since their recent introduction to Israel’s border, the operation of the biometric or 
smart cards has stirred much confusion. Are the cards a privilege or a burden? Who must 
hold them? What is the information inscribed on the card? Who is allowed access to this 
information? Are identification cards and permits still required for those holding smart 
cards? And what is the new behavior required from Palestinians at the crossings with 
regard to this card?  
When confronted with these questions, the two groups of interviewees, high 
military officials and human rights activists, contradict each other on numerous fronts. 
One example of such a contradiction regards the type of bodily information inserted into 
or read by the card. Both MachsomWatch activists and several retired military officials 
believe that the card reads one’s fingerprints, “like at Ben-Gurion airport.” Colonel Paz, 
on the other hand, insists that I didn’t actually see a biometric machine at the Bethlehem 
crossing. The card is not yet in use, he assures me, and when they do activate it, it will 
read various bodily data but not fingerprints. Finally, a high official in the current 
Crossing Administration clarifies that: “Although it seems like it [the smart card] 
documents the front when you put your hand down – [the machine] actually checks the 
back of the hand. But, he says, “this isn’t such a good system … [so] we are moving to 
the front of the hand and the iris” (Micha, interview). 
In an interview, Bezalel Treiber, Head of the new Crossing Administration, 
refuses to state the name of the biometric company that has been supplying Israel with its 
smart cards and machines. Eventually, he agrees to disclose that it is a company in 
Massachusetts; the only company there that provides back-of-the-hand biometric 
technology (telephone conversation). But what can be so secretive about a technology 
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used in public and openly contracted by the Ministry of Defense? Again, the answer lies 
in the importance of secrecy to the occupation’s bureaucracy, which is, in turn, highly 
fused with confusion. Inaccessibility to knowledge is the assumption, while accessibility 
is merely a privilege of the few. One way or the other, similar to the SafeView sensors, 
the new technology of smart cards facilitates both an objectification of the Palestinian 
and a translation of his or her human wholeness into fragmented bodily data (see also 
Amoore 2006). 
Although nonhuman actants (Latour 1987) are perceived as stripped from agency 
and thus as passive and technical, they are in fact a crucial component of the complex 
identification networks operative in border bureaucracies. Despite being (or precisely 
because they are) nonhuman, computers, plastic cards, and paper forms are what makes 
the material connections between the Israeli registries and the Palestinian subjects. In the 
new regime, machines do most of the dirty work, obscuring within them the story of their 
human programming and design (see also Gary Marx’s work on the techno-fallacies of 
the age of information; 2007: 98). 
A final remark about Israel’s new smart cards. In October 2008, the Israeli 
Knesset passed a first legislation proposal that requires every Israeli resident to carry a 
biometric form of identification (Legislative Proposal 2008). This proposal lays bare that 
alongside the border’s intense reterritorialization, it is also fluid and dynamic. Despite the 
prominent belief that Israel can safeguard its citizens from what goes on at the border and 
can even make this border invisible to them, the lines are crossed in more ways than is 
apparent or that could have been foreseen. The recent improvement in surveillance 
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mechanisms, although directed toward Palestinians, penetrates into Israel in all kinds of 
ways other than through its official entrance through the new border crossings. 
Civilizing the Border: A Project of Neoliberalization  
 
[T]o lessen the existing friction in the security checks, humanize the 
process, and improve standards of service, security will be privatized and 
civilians rather than soldiers will conduct all security checks (Ministry of 
Defense Press Release 2006). 
 
Civilization  
Up to this point, the paper has discussed some of the physical designs and 
technologies of bureaucratic identification utilized by Israel in its new border 
administration. I now proceed to discuss the human changes introduced as part of this 
renewal. In 2003 the IDF inaugurated the program “Another Life.” The aim of this 
program was to “minimize the damage to Palestinian life fabric (mirkam haim) in order to 
avoid a humanitarian crisis that would necessitate the IDF to provide food and services to 
the Palestinian population” (Weizman 2007: 290n36). Baruch Spiegel, a graduate of an 
MBA program who previously convinced the IDF to employ a management strategy in 
Gaza – was then appointed as IDF Director of Civilian and Humanitarian Issues 
(Weizman 2007:143).  
According to a plan that Spiegel devised, twelve permanent closure checkpoints 
were to be built along the length of the newly constructed Separation Barrier. Similar to 
Israel’s other international terminals, they were to be operated by Israel’s Airport 
Authority: Reshet. The first implementation stage rendered Reshet’s management of the 
crossing impractical “because of the scale . . . when the Gaza Strip was open for entry 
into Israel many more people crossed it in a day than they cross Ben Gurion Airport, and 
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I’m talking about one crossing only. . . . So, Reshet couldn’t carry this [forth]” (Paz, 
interview). 
The task at hand, then, was to create an alternative administration that would take 
on the role of managing the new crossings. Eventually, the Ministry of Defense – a 
governmental entity with security as its top interest – was chosen to oversee the 
management of the new border, while the on-the-ground work was to be conducted by 
private companies. In 2004, a separate body was created within the Ministry of Defense 
to manage this new apparatus. It was named Minhelet Ha’Maavarim or the Crossing 
Administration (Treiber, interview). 
Shaul Mofaz, then Minister of Defense, appointed Bezalel Treiber to serve as 
head of the new administration. As former head of the cabinet of the Minister of Defense 
and former deputy chief of Israel’s Airport Authority, Treiber embodies the two 
overarching agendas of the new border: security, on the one hand, and consumer 
orientation, on the other hand. The “civilization” (in Hebrew izruach, literally “making 
civil”) of the crossings is an on-going process, Treiber tells me, and is taking much 
longer than originally expected. 
Qalandia crossing, which connects Jerusalem with Ramallah, was the first to be 
civilized at the end of 2005. This process continued, Treiber tells me, and to date includes 
11 of 40 passages. Because of their sensitive status, he says, Israeli border police 
continue to manage the Jerusalem passages, with assistance from private guards and 
Israeli soldiers. 
The purpose of demilitarizing and then outsourcing the crossings was mostly 
practical: the IDF was needed for other missions, the daily border operations had a 
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negative effect on the IDF’s reputation, and a professional workforce was deemed to be 
more effective in this situation (interview, Arieli). Yet, Treiber goes out of his way to 
clarify that civilizing the crossings is worlds apart from privatizing them. In his words: 
[T]his is absolutely not a process of privatization. The entire passage is 
under government responsibility from beginning to end. Indeed, the 
people who are doing the work are from a private company… but we 
manage their job. This is completely not privatization, it’s as far from it as 
east is from west. This is not a soldier’s job in any part of the world.  
Treiber’s explanation of the transition stresses the importance of normalization 
and professionalization at the border, attempting to draw comparisons with international 
border sites. This line of reasoning is also supported by various other governmental 
narratives. For example, Israel’s Ombudsman Reports of 2003 and 2005 state the urgency 
of professionalizing the crossings and outsourcing them from military hands (Border 
Passages 2006). Spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense similarly declares that “the 
civilization of the checkpoints is a humanitarian action.” 
(www.mod.gov.il/wordfiles/n32612063.doc, last accessed October 7, 2008). 
On-the-Ground   
A participatory observation that I conducted at the new Bethlehem crossing in 
2008 might illustrate some of the on-the-ground implications of the civilization project. 
During my observation, I was confronted by a border official who requested that I stop 
taking pictures and that I erase all the pictures already in my camera. I was getting ready 
to do so when Hanna Barag, the MachsomWatch activist whom I accompanied to the 
crossing that day, asked the guard for the legal basis of his demand. As it turns out, 
although he was dressed like an Israeli police officer and behaved like one, the guard was 
actually an employee of a private security company and thus not legally authorized to 
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stop me from taking photos.iii How can one tell the difference? I ask Barag, who explains 
that unlike police officers, private guards do not wear nametags and, in fact, unlike public 
officers, they are not even required to identify themselves by name. Meanwhile, the 
humiliated guard fetched the police officer in charge of the crossing. When the latter 
heard that I have a quirky academic interest in signs and turnstiles, he smiled, shrugged 
his shoulders, and said “take as many photos as your heart desires” (participatory 
observation, Bethlehem Crossing, August 10, 2008). The incident did not end there. The 
private security guard stood several feet away from us, eyeing our every move and 
smoking a cigarette (despite a large “No Smoking” sign situated above his head).  
Several points can be inferred from this account. First, that the process of 
civilizing the border is not only about the border’s transformation from a military to a 
civil entity, but also a process that enables a reallocation of blame and responsibility. The 
State of Israel realized that it has something to lose by sacrificing the reputation of its 
soldiers through the time-consuming and mentally-eroding mission of routine checkpoint 
administration. Instead, the responsibility is civilized. If the occupation is associated with 
military order, so goes Israel’s line of thought, then by civilizing the border’s 
administration, Israel can finally step out of the occupation mode and enter into the 
global space of civilized nations. 
Another on-the-ground implication of the new border regime that can be inferred 
from the above incident is its complicated authority structure. Currently, four different 
agencies manage the new crossings: the IDF maintains most of the crossings, the Israeli 
border police manages the crossings in and around Jerusalem, Israel’s Airport Authority 
manages a few crossings on the border with Jordan, and civilian security guards dispersed 
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through the crossings are employed by private companies but managed by the Ministry of 
Defense.  
Who, then, is in charge in a particular place and time? According to Treiber, the 
hierarchy is clear: while those who do the on-the-ground work are civilians, the Crossing 
Administration he heads is always in charge. The same is true with regard to the soldiers 
or police who operate at the crossings, he says, whose authority is supreme to that of 
private security guards. But while clear to Treiber, this situation is yet another source of 
confusion for Palestinians. Indeed, if not for my knowledgeable companion and for our 
privileged Jewish Israeli identity to back it up, I would most likely have refrained from a 
direct confrontation with the border official. This representation of authority is likely to 
yield even more success when exercised toward Palestinians, as any questioning of 
authority on their part could have severe and unforeseen consequences.  
Supposedly constraining the behavior of certain border officials by increasing 
supervision of their conduct, the hierarchical structure at the new crossings in fact creates 
yet additional figures of power. Whereas in the past, the Palestinian could possibly 
identify the person issuing the commands, now this is made almost impossible. This 
perhaps unplanned but nonetheless useful uncertainty at Israel’s new border feeds into 
Israel’s overall bureaucracy of occupation (Handel 2007; Braverman 2009). 
A third on-the-ground insight that could be drawn from my little incident at the 
Bethlehem crossing is about how the contradictory messages of consumer-based and 
security approaches reside side by side in this place. In light of the intended 
transformation of the Israel-West Bank border from a military to a civilian regime, one 
would expect that the civilian aspects of this border management would be highlighted 
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and made immediately apparent. Instead, the new private guards are dressed like soldiers. 
To the untrained eye, this might seem like an extension of the old border regime. On the 
one hand, then, Israel goes out of its way to create an impression of newness and to let 
the world know that through civilization, it is now aligning itself with other nations. On 
the other hand, Israel does not bother to make this transformation more readily visible to 
anyone who actually visits this space.  
How could one explain this discrepancy? The answer lies in the multitude of 
presentations that occur at the border and, more importantly, in the multitude of 
audiences that these presentations are intended toward. One presentation is meant for the 
Israeli and international eye. On this front, the border’s re-design is made to seem 
significant and transformative. The Palestinians, on the other hand, rarely get to see this 
new face-lift, and instead are confronted with the confusion heralded by the border’s 
increasing bureaucratization.  
This sort of dissonance between performances is everywhere: in the outside signs 
welcoming the passengers and wishing them good health that are surrounded by heaps of 
trash and debris; in the inside signs blinking “have a pleasant stay,” yet obscured by thick 
layers of bars and fences; and in the twelve new booths installed to serve passengers, of 
which only four are regularly operative. The general design of the place thus sends 
conflicting messages: you are a customer and, as such, we are here to serve you better, 
but you are at the same time also dangerous and, remember, you also live under an 
occupation regime that strictly controls your every move.  
Similarly, Israel’s official brochures as well as its official website speak about a 
consumer model that includes considerations of the local mirkam haim (fabric of life). On 
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the other hand, a virtual tour of recent images, videos, and reports presented on 
MachsomWatch’s website depicts Palestinians standing in line for hours, climbing over 
each other to make it to the Israeli side, and subjected to overwhelming and confusing 
instructions.iv Furthermore, these human rights websites do not distinguish between 
Israel’s old and new crossings. Have they neglected to notice the transformation in 
Israel’s border regime? MachsomWatch activists interviewed here are not only skeptical 
about this transformation, they are also pessimistic: they perceive the new regime not 
only as an extension of the old but, even more so, as enabling a more sophisticated mode 
of occupation altogether (see, e.g., interviews with Elkana and Barag). In the name of 
improved service and humaneness, then, Israel’s new border actually secures a tighter 
form of control, they say.  
Conclusion: The “General Wink”  
You work vis-à-vis a well oiled machine, messy on purpose . . . Today it’s 
closed, tomorrow open, today there’s no this, tomorrow the machine 
breaks down, all kinds of nonsense, none of which are coincidental. It’s all 
directed. Of course, there’s no one sitting upstairs saying ‘make a mess’… 
No one would dare say such a thing. But there’s a – I call it – a general 
wink, and the general wink makes all of this possible, otherwise it 
wouldn’t be happening (Barag, interview). 
 
This paper has focused on the changes that have been taking place at Israel’s 
border with the occupied West Bank in the last two decades, and especially since 2004, 
the time of the Wall’s inauguration. It has explored these changes through a variety of 
themes: first, the reterritorialization of the border. The paper identified the many ways in 
which the Israel-West Bank border has shifted from being ad hoc and transient into a 
fixed infrastructural construction. This is not to say that Israel’s occupation has ceased to 
take place through portable and internal(ized) borders. In fact, I have pointed to several 
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instances where it does, for example in the stretching of liminality in both space and time 
to include the upstream and the downstream movement toward the border. But this, I 
have argued, is precisely an extension of the physical border, and depends on its 
materiality and stability as such. Contrary to the recent border literature on the EU and 
Mexico-US border, then, I have highlighted here the material, mechanical, and 
infrastructural elements of the Israel-West Bank border.  
Secondly, the paper has situated the border’s territorialization within an enhanced 
process of bureaucratization. This is to say that instead of focusing on the despotic 
military power inherent in this border, the paper has focused on its infrastructural 
properties. The consolidation of the border and its mechanization have enabled its 
increased rationalization, standardization, and professionalization. The infrastructural 
turn has brought about a new form of surveillance, one that relies of intensified networks 
of identification and on bureaucratic sophistication. These have given birth to another 
sort of confusion, another mode of alienation of the Palestinian subject from that which 
was produced by the aggressive physical encounter that was the strength of the old 
model. The old model, I should again clarify, has all but disappeared from this space. But 
while it is still operative, it is much less at the center of Israel’s new border regime.  
Thirdly, both the infrastructural mechanization of the border and its heightened 
focus on identification have been carried out in the name of the modernized neoliberal 
project. Israel’s rhetoric throughout this shift has been consumer-based and has 
highlighted efficiency and globalization as its central themes. Accordingly, the new 
border vocabulary refers to the checkpoints as international crossings and to the 
Palestinians as passengers. But at the crossings, the signs that welcome the incoming 
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passengers and bid them a safe and productive journey are obscured by iron fences and 
piling trash. Israel’s neoliberal move is thus cluttered, or perhaps intensified, by its 
heightened securitization. 
Finally, there is the paper’s heightened focus on things. Along with their role as 
the most visible manifestations of Israel’s modernization scheme, things also implicate 
the complexity of the bureaucratic and the neoliberal schemes. Computers, smart cards, 
turnstiles, queues, and SafeView machines are all things that hide within their design a 
human form of surveillance, taking the edge off of Israel’s enhanced regime of 
occupation. Through utilizing things, border inspection seems not only technical, 
scientific, and neutral, but also positive and progressive. The border is thus rendered part 
of Israel’s project of civilizing this space. However, as I have shown, the intensified use 
of nonhuman things – in effect, the de-humanization of the border – has simultaneously 
translated into a project of dehumanizing the Palestinian.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i A 2007 survey found that 250 of each 1,000 soldiers were involved in or witnessed harassment 
against Palestinians at the army checkpoints. http://www.imemc.org/article/52016 (last accessed 
January 23, 2009).  
ii For example, a sick Palestinian woman had to travel 125 kilometers to reach the nearby hospital 
45 kilometers away (Handel 2007: 113).  
iii Two laws regulate the authorities and conduct of Israeli security guards: Administration of 
Security in Public Agencies Law – 1988 and Authorities for Securing Public Safety Law – 2005 
(both in Hebrew).     
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iv See, e.g., Qualandia Checkpoint, the second Friday of the Ramadan at 
http://www.machsomwatch.org/en/qualandia_checkpoint_second_friday_ramadan (last viewed 
November 1, 2008). 
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August 10, 2008 
Yudit Elkana, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Jerusalem, August 3, 2008 
Ada Gorni, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Jerusalem, August 7, 2008 
Micha, Head of Administration and Funding of the Passage Administration, interview by 
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